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1.  Introduction 
"America needs to act not from the belief that we are and can remain dominant, but 
from an understanding of how we can be effective in circumstances in which we no 
longer are."1 
 
This is the concluding remark in a 1992 book on the challenges faced by American 
foreign policy in "the next security system", marked by the end of the cold war, a 
changed distribution of economic power between the U.S., Japan and Europe, and by 
new modes of economic competition in an increasingly internationalized and 
globalized world economy. 
 
The words used in the quote to capture the essence of the present situation from an 
American policy perspective reveal an implicit theoretical question. The challenge is 
to maintain effectiveness when no longer being dominant while the terms hegemony 
and leadership, key concepts in virtually all major theoretical discussions of 
America's global role over the last decades, are not used in the final remark. The 
notions are not absent from the authors' thinking, though. In the preceding paragraphs 
they state that hegemony has changed and "American leadership is no longer a matter 
of necessity, but of political choice", in contradiction of the "Bound to lead" 
argument forwarded by Joseph Nye a few years earlier.2 Thus two questions are 
intertwined: one concerning the position and role of the U.S. in the present 
international system, the other concerning the concepts of hegemony and leadership 
and their relevance for the analysis and understanding of this problem.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to carry this discussion one bit further by relating a dis-
cussion of the concept of hegemony to recent American foreign policies in areas of 
great significance for the evolution of the international political economy, namely the 
regional liberalization and integration projects in Europe and the Pacific Basin within 
the overall framework of the evolution of the global and multilateral trade regime in 
GATT/WTO. 
                     
1) Borrus, Sandholtz, Weber & Zysman, "Epilogue" in Sandholtz et.al. The Highest Stakes. The 
Economic Foundations of the Next Scurity System, New York: Oxford University Press 1992. 
2) Nye, Bound to Lead, New York: Basic Books 1990. 
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2. Concepts of hegemony 
The litterature on hegemony abounds in definitions that emphasize different aspects 
of the problem, and indeed also point to different problems although a common 
denominator for all usages of the term is some kind of a position of power.3 For 
present purposes it is useful to distinguish between two different discources in which 
the notion has been used and developed. One deals with the relations between nation 
states; here of course we find discussions af American and British hegemony. The 
other has its roots in analyses of domestic relations of power and especially in 
Gramscian notions of ideological power. This  understanding of hegemony has been 
carried into the international realm in discussions of hegemony that do not point to 
relations between states, but rather to relations between global social forces, 
emphasizing at the same time ideological aspects of international relations of power.4 
Although I find this approach highly relevant, and not incompatible with the former, 
I will not discuss it further in this paper, since it would complicate matters 
considerably. 
  In the first broad strand of discussion, where hegemony refers to the position of a 
nation-state, major dimensions that have been associated with the concept are i) 
hegemony as a position of power, the possession of a prepondarance of power 
ressources, ii) a hegemonic role as the maintainer of overall systemic stability and 
leader in the creation and maintenance of collective goods and international regimes, 
iii) a more specific variety of this, namely a liberal hegemon's role in securing a 
liberal international economic order, and finally iv) a hegemon as a power with 
stronger ability to influence outcomes than anybody else, being able to use this for its 
own good or for the common good, a usage that enables the distinction between good 
- altruistic - and bad - egoistic- hegemonic policies. Associated with this is the 
distinction between hegemony based on coercion and hegemony based on consent, 
some writers reserving the term to latter kind, thus pointing to a specific overlap with 
the Gramsci-inspired usages of the term. These dimensions are not all mutually 
exclusive, and are combined in various ways by different writers.  
  In the light of the shift from leadership as necessity to leadership as choice 
suggested by Borrus et.al. it is worth pointing out that except from the first 
dimension, if isolated, there is in all these understandings an element of policy 
choice. Power is not only a static situation of possessing resources, but also a 
dynamic ability to affect outcomes in political practise. In this sense hegemony has 
never referred only to a given situation, but also to a pattern of hegemonic policies 
geared to use this position to affect outcomes, and to maintain the position itself. 
Indeed - the twin aspects of being able and willing to lead, the latter pointing to the 
                     
3) For a full discussion and references see Ougaard, "Dimensions of hegemony" in Cooperation and 
Conflict XXIII, 1988 197-214. 
4) The main proponent of this approach is Robert W. Cox in Production, Power and World Order. 
Social Forces in the Making of History, New York: Columbia University Press 1987. 
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element of policy choice - has been present in most usages of the concept since 
Kindleberger's introduction of the theory of hegemonic stability. 
  What also is present, although often only implicity, is a notion of the pattern of 
interests underlying the position of hegemony. The concept of hegemony to be used 
here makes this dimension explicit and hinges on i) a smaller or greater 
preponderance of capabilities and ii) a constellation of interests marked by shared 
and common basic interests and conflicting secondary ones. In other words, 
hegemony is defined as a position of power within a group of nations that can be 
seen as an alliance, whether it is formally organized as such or not. In this 
understanding the hegemon's overall role can be defined doubly as one of leadership 
in securing the shared interest while simultaneously catering to its own interests in 
cases of conflict within the framework of the alliance. In consequence, the concept of 
hegemony to be used here points to the role and position of the U.S. within the group 
of industrialized market economies.5  
 
 
3. Hegemony and regionalization 
The issue to discuss is hegemonic response to and participation in regional 
integration efforts. The term regional integration is used in a wide sense, covering the 
formation of free trade areas and stronger forms of economic integration, as well as 
more encompassing varieties of political integration, including closer cooperation in 
defence and security matters. The European unification project is, of course, the 
strongest contemporary example of regional integration. In the perspective of the 
concept of hegemony employed here an important distinction must be made between 
regional projects in which the hegemonic power participates, in this paper called 
inclusive regionalization, and regional projects without hegemonic participation, 
called exclusive regionalization. 
  In relation to exclusive regionalization, the basic fact is that it presents a dual 
perspective for the hegemon, namely that of stronger allies on one hand and stronger 
competitors and potential rivals on the other. Consequently, the logical response to 
this kind of regionalization is quite simply to gain the benefits of stronger allies while 
avoiding the risks presented by the emergence of powerful competitors and rivals. 
The safest strategy is to oppose regionalization efforts, but if this is not possible, the 
policy must be to strive to shape them in accordance with the underlying shared 
interests, and to oppose aspects of the regionalization effort that would endanger 
these or endanger the position of the hegemon itself. 
  Inclusive integration projects, on the other hand, especially in trade matters, can be 
seen as retreats from the hegemon's global leadership role since they imply a reduced 
emphasis on the maintanance of a multilateral open trading system. On the other 
hand, the standard justifications of regional liberalization, that they are acceptable in 
so far as they contribute to global liberalization, and that they can provide political 
                     
5) The exact membership of this group is not to be discussed here. A reasonable operational criterion 
is OECD-membership, but some of the NICs should be included as well. The exclusion of a large 
part of the third world does not mean that the concept of hegemony is irrelevant for them, it 
rather is a consequence of the fact that the rich industrialized world has a shared position vis-a-vis 
the third world. Hegemony in the present usage denotes the role of the US within this bloc, not 
the relations between the bloc and the rest of the world.  
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leverage against the formation of competing regional blocs, are relevant here. And 
since the hegemon is a participant, the risk that this kind of regionalization 
jeopardizes the hegemon's own economic interests is non-existent or at least much 
smaller than in the case of exclusive regionalization. In sum inclusive regionalization 
is an aberration from a globalist strategy, but it is much preferable to exclusive 
regionalization, and can even be used as leverage against it, provided it is shaped in 
accordance with the overall multilateral strategy. 
  
  The question now is the extent to which U.S. policies towards regional integration 
in Europe and the Pacific Basin fit this logic. Developments in the Americas are not 
included, although a full account would have to include them, since the U.S. here has 
been an active initiator of regional integration efforts. The reason for this omission is 
partly one of space, but mainly that the comparison between Trans-Atlantic and 
Trans-Pacific relations is of relevance in itself because these are the regions where 
the U.S. is facing major industrialized market economies. In reviewing these two 
regional cases it must be remembered that they must be seen against the backdrop of 
the concurrent protracted diplomatic struggle for the completion of the Uruguay 
Round, in which the U.S. exercised a clear and eventually largely succesful leaders-
hip role. 
 
 
 
4. U.S. response to European integration6 
After a period of stagnation the process of European integration gathered momentum 
from the mid-1980s. Key events were the 1985 decision to create the Single 
European Market by 1992, and the decision in 1988 to re-initiate the process of 
integration. This lead on to the 1989 Delors-plan for an Economic and Monetary 
Union, and eventually the signing in early 1992 of the Maastricht Treaty in which a 
foreign policy and security dimension, embodied in plans for the strengthening of the 
WEU, was added. These developments present the perpective of an unified European 
actor emerging on the world scene. This new actor would undoubtedly be a true great 
power, with the potential for becoming a superpower, comparable in economic, 
political and military terms to the United States. 
  It has become evident since then that the process is not a smooth and even one. The 
dual challenge of integration in depth - fulfilling the Maastricht ambitions -  and 
integration in breadth - adding new members and developing new links with Eastern 
European countries - while responding to major challenges such as the war in ex-
Yougoslavia, has proved a tough assignment. But the basic drive towards further 
integration, economically and politically, persists, and it is the American response to 
this process that interests us here. 
                     
6) The following draws mainly on my "Dealing with the Community: The Bush Administrations's 
Response to Western European Integration" in Nørgaard, Petersen & Pedersen, The European 
Community in World Politics, London: Pinter Publishers 1993. For a recent summary of US 
policy in the first year of the Clinton Administration see  Smith & Woolcock, "Learning to 
Cooperate: The Clinton Administration and the European Union", International Affairs Vol 70, 
no 3, 1994. The account given herein is fully compatible with my analysis.  
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  The U.S. response has been seen by some observes as one of "strategic indirection"7 
and of "uneven and fragmentary" adaptation to change.8 This perception of confusion 
is nourished by the seeming contradiction between American support for some 
aspects of the integration efforts and determined opposition to other sides of it. But if 
we take a closer look at the central contents of the American response, a different 
perspective emerges. 
  First the well known fact that the U.S. has been a supporter of European integration 
in words and deed since its beginning should be recalled.  
  Second, when the new stage in European unification began, the U.S. was not slow 
to respond. Already in 1989 the Bush Administration called for the development of 
"new mechanisms of consultation and cooperation",9 initiating a change in the formal 
diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the EU. This process culminated in the 
joint Declaration on US-EC relations in November 1990, which represents a formal 
diplomatic recognition of the EU as an international player in its own right. In 
parallel with this elevation of the EC's diplomatic ranking, the U.S. has in public 
statements strongly endorsed the process of unification. In the words of President 
Bush: a "strong united Europe is very much in America's interest. A more united 
Europe offers the United States a more effective partner, prepared for larger 
responsibilities."10 In sum, the American response to the overall perspective of a 
more unified EC has been to declare support in principle, to accept the integration 
process according to its own speed an dynamics, and to treat the EC as an 
international actor in its own right, in so far as it acts like one. 
  Thirdly, after initial skepticism and fears of "Fortress Europe", the U.S. developed a 
positive but nuanced policy towards the Single Market project. The premises 
underlying this policy were established through a number of comprehensive studies 
of the 1992 project and its likely consequences for the U.S. The tenor of these were 
that the Single Market would in general be good for American businesses, but that it 
might also lead to the creation of stronger competition in some areas as well as to 
protectionism and lack of transparency in some fields. Since Europe is a major 
importer of American goods, the perspective of stronger growth here would help 
U.S. exports. Furthermore, since many American companies had long had a Europe-
wide perspective to their FDI operations here, they were being seen as being better 
positioned to take advantage of the internal market than many European competitors 
who until recently had operated within national frameworks. 
  Accordingly the policy became to endorse the project in principle, while at the same 
time warning aginst possible negative consequences for American interests, and to 
back this by intensified diplomatic efforts to counter such consequences. According 
to U.S. officials, the policy is to closely monitor developments in the EC and to 
                     
7) Deibel, "Bush's Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction", Foreign Policy no 84, 1991.  
8) Smith, "The Devil You Know: The United States and a Changing European Community", 
International Affairs, 68 (1) 1992. 
9) Bush speech in Boston, November 1990, as printed in USIA PDQ Index and Text Database, EUR 
503, 11/23/90. 
10) U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 16 December 1991. 
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present American concerns as early as possible and before the EC adopts firm 
positions. Among other things, this is reflected in the expansion of the diplomatic 
staff in Brussels and in increased contacts between Washington-based bureaucrats 
and the EC Commission. The pattern of American resistance to specific policies set 
in a larger pattern of support for European integration was also evident in the 
Uruguay round, where the EC was a major ally in some issues, while at the same 
time the U.S. maintained a continued strong, and eventually largely succesful, 
pressure on others, like agriculture and Airbus subsidies. This specifically calls 
attention to the fact that resistance can be determined and persistent when significant 
American interests are involved. 
  Fourth, the plans for an Economic and Monetary Union has met with a similarly 
differentiated U.S. response, although American policy in this area is less developed 
for the simple reason that it still mainly is responding to intentions and plans, not to 
established facts. So far the official position has been one of clear and unequivocal 
support for the project, as indicated by the Bush statement quoted above, combined 
with an expression of concern that Europe pursues responsible fiscal and monetary 
policies. 
  Fifth and finally, a similar pattern is to be seen in defence and security matters, 
although the element of American opposition has been much more in evidence here. 
The central issue involved is the nature of the EU "defence identity" and its relations 
to NATO.  
  From the outset the U.S. emphazised that a stronger Europe was welcome, and 
indeed could be seen as a contribution to increased burden-sharing, which for long 
had been an American desire. But at the same time a persistent American theme was 
that the "link between the United States and the European Community should 
become stronger" and that the "substantive overlap between NATO and European 
institutions must lead to synergy, not friction."11 A critical point in trans-atlantic rela-
tions were reached in early 1991, when the U.S. employed unusually strong 
diplomatic measures - formal démarches to all WEU governments - to oppose 
German-French proposals for what was seen as possibly entailing a European 
military force outside of NATO. In a blunt statement U.S. ambassador to NATO, 
William H. Taft, said that "undermining the alliance's integrated military structure in 
the uncertain process of developing a European security identity would be the height 
of folly."12 
  Eventually agreement was reached along the lines of an earlier British proposal for 
a so-called "double-hatted" Euro-corps, covered by the formula "separable but not 
separate" that was officially adopted by the NATO-summit in early 1994. The key 
feature of this formula is that the common European army is to be located firmly 
within NATO's integrated command structure, and thus susceptible to American 
veto, but organized in such a way that it can operate independently of the U.S. (This 
actually is the way in which all national armies of the NATO members have worked 
                     
11) Secretary Baker's speach in Berlin, December 1989, US department of State, American Foreign 
Policy, Current Documents, Washington DC, 1990:305. 
12) US Mission to NATO, Ambassador William H. Taft, The NATO Role in Europe and the U.S: Role 
in NATO, presented to the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 21 May 1992 
(emphasis added). 
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all along.) Time will show whether this is a durable formula or merely the first step 
towards a genuinely separate European military force. But for the time being an 
evolution that entails the possible creation of a new independent military power, with 
the potential for becoming a competitor, has been avoided. 
 
  In sum, the main features of American policy has been to endorse European 
unification; to elevate the EC's diplomatic ranking and to deal with it as an inter-
national actor in so far as it behaves like one; to influence EC policy making as 
effective as possible when American interests are touched; to accept the single 
market and the prospects of EMU while opposing protectionism and macro-
economic policies considered contrary to American interests; and to support the 
development of a European defence identity while firmly opposing (but not quite 
successfully) steps towards a separate military structure outside the NATO 
framwork.  
 
5. Regionalization in the Pacific Basin 
Based on the current intensification of economic and political ties with East Asia it is 
sometimes said that the U.S. is turning eastwards, away from Europe. Occasionally 
this idea gains support from official statements, as for instance when Warren 
Christopher 1993, in a mood of irritation with European criticism of U.S. foreign 
policy, said that the U.S. for too long had had an "Eurocentric attitude"13 and that 
Asia now was much more positive towards the U.S. than Europe. But this image is 
wrong, at least for two reasons. One is that the U.S. is not turning away from Europe, 
merely changing its mode of involvement as a response to European developments. 
The other is that American involvement in East Asia is nothing new. Although 
historical ties and cultural bonds with Europe are much stronger, the U.S. has been 
deeply involved in Asian affairs for more than a century. As the Clinton 
Administration likes to point out, Americans have fought three wars in Asia in this 
century14; it is the only region where the U.S. has possessed a major colony; the 
region was a major arena in the Cold War; and it contains the vital shipping lanes to 
the Middle East. For the last decades the region's economic significance as well as 
America's economic involvement with it has been growing year by year, thus adding 
to its importance for the U.S. and to the complexity of America's engagement. But it 
is hardly a new involvement.  
  However, the combined effects of the end of the Cold War, the rise of the region's 
economies, and the deepening of economic internationalization mean that a new 
stage in trans-Pacific relations has been opened. The process of reordering the Pacific 
and South-East Asian regime structure gained momentum in the late 1980's and has 
so far reached its culmination in APEC's November 1994 decision to create an Asia-
Pacific Free Trade Area by the year 2020.15 The main aspects of this process are the 
                     
13) Washington Post 17.10.1993. 
14) E.g. "Statement by Deputy Secretary Talbott at the Six-plus-Sven Open Session of the ASEAN 
Post-Ministerial Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, July 26, 1944, U.S. Department of State 
Dispatch, Vol 5 no 32, 1994, and U.S. President, A National Security Strategy of Engagement 
and Enlargement, The White House, July 1994. 
15) Financial Times 16.11.1994. 
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further evolution of regional cooperation among the nations of South East Asia, and 
the pursuit of two contending perspectives for more encompassing patterns of 
cooperation: on one hand an East and South-East Asian regime of economic 
cooperation that excludes the Eastern Rim of the Pacific and particularly the U.S.; on 
the other hand the All-Pacific regime that so far - not surprisingly - has been the most 
successful one. 
 
The evolution of regional cooperation has principally been focussed on ASEAN, 
which already by 1977 had established a "preferential trade agreeement", although of 
little consequence.16 But in early 1992 ASEAN reached agreement on a more 
ambitious goal, namely to establish a free trade area within 15 years.17 Furthermore, 
the ASEAN countries have recently given renewed emphasis to the proposal going 
back to 1971 for a ZOPFAN18 (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) with the 
goal of ensuring the region's "stability and security from external interference in any 
form or manifestation".19 
  In addition recent years have seen other kinds of moves towards intensified bilateral 
and mulitilateral cooperation among the nations of the region, for instance several 
proposals to form smaller free trade zones along the lines of the Shenzen Free Trade 
Zone (Hong Kong + Guangdong Province of PRC) 20 as well as other types of 
cooperation in specific matters. In general this process is marked by step by step and 
issue by issue approaches, and the overall pattern seems to be not so much one of 
emerging regimes as one of a generally improved atmosphere of dialogue and 
beginning cooperation. 
  In the present context the fate of the two rivalling schemes of an inclusive and an 
exclusive architecture (with and without the eastern rim) of economic cooperation is 
of greater interest because of the greater potential significance of the outcome and 
since it sheds important light on U.S. preferences and policies in the area.  
  Initially it was Japan that took the lead in suggesting a more institutionalized form 
of trans-pacific cooperation. In 1967 the Japanese Prime Minister suggested a Pacific 
Free Trade Area and in the same year private business groups formed the Pacific 
Basin Economic Council.21 Another private forum: the Pacific Trade and 
                     
16) Gary R. Saxonhouse "Trading Blocs and East Asia" in De Melo & Panagariya (eds), New 
Dimensions in Regional Integration, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press 1993, p 411, Hine, 
"Regionalism and the integration of the World Economy" Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol XXX No 2, and Bollard & Mayes, "Regionalism and the Pacific Rim" , Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol XXX No. 2, 1992. 
17) Saxonhouse op.cit. p 411. 
18) "Communique of the 27th ASEAN Ministerial, Bangkok, Thailand, July 22-23, 1994, as printed in 
U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Vol 5 no 32, 1994. 
19) Amitav Acharya, "A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era" 
Adelphi Papers 279, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 1993.  
20) Saxonhouse op.cit. p 411. 
21) The following account is based on Donald Crone: "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization 
of the Pacific Political Economy" in World Politics pp 501 - 525, Vol 445 No 4, July 1993. 
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Development Conference, "essentially an economists forum" met in 1968 for the first 
time. Again in the 1970s Japan took the lead in suggesting an official pacific forum, 
and intense Japanese lobbying led to the first serious consideration by U.S. Congress, 
and to the first Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Canberra (PECC) in 
September 1980. Participants included goverment, business and academic 
representatives, from both sides of the Pacific, but governments were only represen-
ted unofficially and the meetings, 9 of which were held through 1992, "remained 
strictly nongovernmental". Over the years the number of countries represented grew 
as Brunei, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong entered, while the USSR became an observer 
in 1986 and Russia a member in 1992. 
  At first the U.S. was somewhat skeptical and did apparently not support Japanese 
and Korean proposals for annual summit meeting among the PEEC member states. 
According to Crone, the reason for this was the long established preference for global 
economic forums - the GATT - and forums in which North-South issues would not 
become divisive, as for instance the OECD. From the opposite position the ASEAN 
states were afraid of Northern dominance, and consequently rejected the proposals. 
  But around 1989 the U.S. attitude began to change as a response to deeper structural 
changes as well as to initiatives taken in the region. Australia became a strong 
proponent of an Asia-Pacific forum and tried to to get a formative meeting in 1989. 
This was a response to the European move towards the single market in 1992 and to 
the moves towards NAFTA. It seems that Australia, supported by Japan, first wanted 
to create an exclusive Asian bloc, without the U.S., but this met with resistance in 
some ASEAN-countries. It was in this situation that the U.S. signalled a change in 
attitude and a willingness to participate in a Pacific regime. Since the proposal for an 
inclusive forum had been around for some years, it was possible for the U.S. to coopt 
this as a counter to the moves towards the exclusive alternative. What followed was a 
sustained diplomatic campaign by the U.S. to get APEC going, and to make it into a 
regime of some substance. In Crone's words: "apparently, prior U.S. reluctance to so 
engage in the region was overcome by the prospect of being left out and being the 
target of such a bloc. The close economic linkages between the U.S. and other Pacific 
states, combined with the absolute size of the U.S. economy, essentially dictated that 
U.S. participation could not be denied."22 With strong diplomatic backing from the 
U.S., the process gained momentum and has so far resulted in the Bogor decision to 
establish an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area mentioned above. It is of course debatable 
how strong this regime is, and there are valid reasons for doubting the effectivenes of 
the Bogor decisions. Still, the results so far amount to an alteration of the trans-
pacific political structure that cannot be considered insignificant. 
  But the competing idea of some form of exclusive Asian and South East Asian 
economic cooperation did not subside, and in parallel with the events described 
above it was promoted by forces in the region, principally Malaysia. Thus in 1990 
President Mahatir suggested an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), consisting of 
Japan, the East Asian NICS, China, and the rest of ASEAN. The precise role of such 
a group was never set out in detail, but "it was clear at the outset that EAEG was 
meant to be the East Asian response to emerging trade blocs in Europe and the 
                     
22) Crone op.cit. p 520. 
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Americas."23 It was strongly opposed by the U.S., and by Australia and New 
Zealand, who now preferred an inclusive solution. 
  Nothing came of the Malaysian proposal, but it is worth noting that Malaysia's 
preference for an exclusive arrangement and its skepticism towards the inclusive one 
apparantly not have subsided. At the Bogor meeting President Mahatir made a point 
of the non-binding nature of the time-table for the creation of a free trade area,24 and 
the proposal for an exclusive group - now also called an East Asiatic Economic 
Caucus - was still being discussed, and not by Malaysia alone. The idea has now 
gained backing from China, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Brunei.25 It even has some support in Japan, and although officially 
Japan is decidedly against it, this reportedly is a result of strong U.S pressure. One 
rumour even helds that "Japanese encouragement may have prompted Mahatir to 
make his proposal in the first place."26 Recently the Japan Association of Corporate 
Executives (Keizai Doyukai) issued a statement "declaring that Japan should accept 
the EAEC plan if it is based on rules of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
and the World Trade Organization",27 indicating that influential business interests are 
more supportive than the government. In addition, there is clear evidence, even in 
official statements, that relations to the U.S. is a major consideration behind Japan's 
reservations toward EAEC. In connection with the Bogor meeting "Tetsuya Endo, 
Japan's special ambassador for APEC, reiterated Tokyo's reservations toward EAEC. 
He urged that the proposed forum not undermine unity between APEC's Eastern and 
Western members. He made clear that the controversy is "very upsetting to Japan".28 
  On the other hand, it probably would be wrong to draw too strong a picture of a 
widespread desire in the region for an exclusive model of economic cooperation that 
only is held back by U.S. resistance. When for instance in 1990 the Confederation of 
Asia-Pacific Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CACCI), counting all the major 
economies of the region except China among its members, issued a document called 
Overcoming the Threat from Western Trade Blocs. A Policy Statement by CACCI29, 
there was no discussion of exclusive regional projects at all. In stead this group 
voiced strong support for GATT and for multilateralism, and criticized 
discrimination in general as well as specific American and European practices. In 
                     
23) Saxonhouse op.cit. p 411. See also Crone, op.cit. and Bollard & Mayes, "Regionalism and the 
Pacific Rim" Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol XXX No 2, June 1992, pp 195-209. 
24) Financial Times 16.11.1994. 
25) International Herald Tribune, 10.11.1994. 
26) Saxonhouse op.cit. p 412. 
27) Nikkei Weekly, 7.11.94. 
28) ibid. 
29) Overcoming the Threat from Western Trade Blocs. A Policy Statement by CACCI, Taipei: CACCI 
1990. 
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addition, the economic merits and feasibility of such a proposal are debatable at 
least.30  
  In sum, there is support for the exclusive model in the region, but it is difficult to 
fathom from the material considered here how strong it is, and to what extent it is 
subdued by pressure from the U.S. and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the fact of active 
U.S. resistance to the idea stands clearly out as does the shift in U.S. policy from 
reservation to a very active support for an inclusive Asia-Pacific regime. 
  What also stands out, however, is that so far APEC is held within the larger 
framework of global multilateralism. Over the years APEC has issued statements 
about the grave consequences of not concluding the Uruguay round, 31 and the 
"APEC Leaders' Declaration of Common Resolve" issued at the Bogor Meeting, 
repeatedly stressed the objective of strengtening the open multilateral trading system. 
Although the U.S. clearly is not the only APEC nation desiring this, it is indicative of 
an outcome that is in accordance with overall U.S. interests. 
  Let us now turn to the question of East Asian regionalism in military and security 
matters. When the ASEAN countries in 1971 suggested the regional security 
arrangement ZOPFAN, the U.S. was reluctant to support it. The  Cold War was the 
overriding concern, and the U.S. relied - after SEATO's demise - on its system of bi-
lateral alliances and other bilateral relationships. One reason was ZOPFAN's explicit 
non-aligned content and southern stance in the North-South confrontation, another 
was simply that the U.S. saw no need for it.32 For long the evolution of ZOPFAN 
was hampered by the three cold wars in the region - U.S.-USSR, USSR-China, and 
China-Vietnam, as well as by ASEAN-Indochina conflicts. But with the subsiding of 
these conflicts, and especially the strong rapproachment between ASEAN and 
Vietnam in recent years, the idea of a regional security arrangements has gained new 
momentum.33  
  Like in the sphere of economic cooperation, two tracks are discernible - an 
exclusive regional one and a more encompassing arrangement. At the core of the 
exclusive track are the ASEAN countries, where already a network of bilateral 
arrangements, including joint military exercises, binds most of the members 
together.34 Based on this one could argue that a "de facto defence community ... 
based on a spider-web network of defence links undertaken bilaterally by the 
ASEAN States" is already in place. But, according to Acharaya, the links are insuffi-
ciently developed, and more importantly, although a genuine military alliance has 
been proposed, there is a consensus against this in the region35, and at the same time 
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31) Crone op.cit. p 523. 
32) Acharya op.cit. 
33) ibid 
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it seems that all countries in the region consider a continued American military 
presense vital.36  
  Yet the ASEAN countries have not forgotten the ZOPFAN proposal. On the 
contrary, at the ASEAN ministerial in Bangkok in July 1994 the members "reiterated 
their determination to continue working towards the early realization of such 
principles and objectives through the effective implementation of ASEAN's 
"Programme of Action for ZOPFAN".37 
  Concomitant with ASEAN's internal evolution it has become the center of a wider 
regional security dialogue. The open and more loosely organized "ASEAN Post-
Ministerial Conferences" have turned out to be a suitable forum, and all major 
players now participate in these. When, after the end of the Cold War, suggestions 
were made for an evolution of this dialogue into an Asian version of the CSCE (now 
OSCE), the U.S. first found it unnecessary and dubbed it a "solution in search of a 
problem".38 But within few years American policy changed to a much more positive 
position. The shift was first signalled by Baker in early 1992, and became more 
pronounced with the Clinton Administration. At the 1994 ASEAN post-ministerial - 
now dubbed the ASEAN Regional Forum - the U.S. officially endorsed the forum, 
stating that it can play "a historical role in conveying intentions, easing suspicions, 
building confidence, and ultimately averting conflicts."39  
  Two things must be noted, however. First that this is a rather loose forum, and the 
American endorsement contains no intentions to develop it beyond what is basically 
an arena for useful talks. Second that the American endorsement says nothing about 
ASEAN's decision to revitalize the more ambitious ZOPFAN proposal, or aboout the 
role that stronger regional military cooperation could play internationally, in contrast 
to the clear and principled comments on Western European defence cooperation, 
which is considered a positive contribution to burden-sharing - albeit with 
reservations as described above. The calls for greater burden-sharing has also gone 
out to East and South-East Asia, especially to Japan, but when it comes to the harder 
realities of security affairs, the U.S. seems still to rely strictly on its own presense and 
its existing bilateral arrangements in the region, and to maintain that greater burden-
sharing must take place only within this framework. 
 
 
 
6.  Comparison and conclusion 
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Several similarities stand out: In the economic sphere U.S. policies towards both 
regions has been shaped by the overriding goal of concluding the Uruguay Round 
and defending in principle an open multilateral trading system. (The fact that the U.S. 
- like virtually all nations - practises selective liberalism is an important qualification 
but does not invalidate this observation.) In the security and military sphere it has 
promoted and defended inclusive architechtures, and in the case of Europe, actively 
resisted the creation of a military structure outside the NATO framwork, while in the 
case of South East Asia it has abstained from supporting the ZOPFAN-proposal and 
the rather vague ideas for a regional military alliance and maintained reliance on 
bilateral arrangements. At the same time, after some hesitation in the Asia-Pacific 
region, in both cases the U.S. has supported and participated in the construction of 
post cold war forums for security dialogue: the CSCE/OSCE in Europe and the more 
loosely organized "ASEAN Regional Forum in East Asia". 
  The main difference is that in Europe the U.S. has endorsed and supported the 
further evolution of an exclusive regional economic integration project, while 
working to shape it in accordance with global multilateralism, whereas in the Asia-
Pacific region it has actively opposed an exclusive project and instead succesfully 
pursued an inclusive one. 
  It is not difficult to point to historical and structural reasons for this difference. In 
Europe, integration has deep historical roots and was initiated with U.S. support in an 
entirely different situation where Cold War necessities and the need to reconstruct 
the European economy after the Second world war was paramount, while at the same 
time economic internationalisation had not reached the depth it has as today. The 
strength and depth of the European integration project would make it impossible for 
the U.S. to counter it, and at the same time the project will in several ways benefit the 
U.S. 
  In East and South East Asia, regional integration is at a much less developed stage; 
for historical reasons the prospect of an East Asian economic cooperation project 
faces difficulties due to animonisities towards Japan; economies and institutions are 
more diverse than in Europe, and less developed in most of the countries; and at the 
same time economic internationalization is at a much more advanced level than in the 
formative years of the European integration project. 
  Furthermore, the interdependence assymmetries are significantly different. The U.S. 
is much stronger vis-a-vis the East Asian nations that towards the EU. The East and 
South East Asian economies are much more export-dependent than Europe and 
exports to the U.S. account for a much larger share of regional GDP than is the case 
in Europe. In 1988 the Asia-Pacific region exported roughly 5.7% of GDP to the 
U.S., whereas the comparable figure for the EU was 2.3%.40  
  For these reasons, the U.S. is in a much stronger position to influence events in East 
and South East Asia than it is in Europe. Consequently the overall pattern of U.S. 
policy is clearly in accordance with the hegemonic logic set out in the theoretical 
section of this paper: when possible, the U.S. has opposed exclusive regional 
integration projects, when not it has co-opted them and worked to shape them to fit 
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the larger strategy of global liberalization, and in the military sphere to locate them 
within an overall security structure that maintains U.S. predominance. 
   The U.S. support for exclusive regionalism in Europe, and the recourse to inclusive 
regionalism in the Pacific Basin (and the Americas) thus perhaps should be seen as a 
tactical retreat from the globalist project, but logically associated with efforts to co-
opt, contain, and use the wave of regionalism and "competing liberalisation" within 
the framework of the larger globalist project. In this interpretation, then, U.S. policy 
seeems to have been fairly succesful so far. 
   The implications for the question of hegemony, finally, is that the U.S. is not strong 
enough to resist the turn towards regionalism in general, but is strong enough to play 
the game of regionalism while maintaining globalist momentum, and strong enough 
to maintain its own role as the key player in the global political economy and in 
security matters in the process. The U.S. is not creating events, but it is decidedly in a 
position to shape them according to its own interests more than anybody else. 
Perhaps this represents a new kind of hegemony, but hegemony it still is.  
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